Crisis of representation in Chile?: the institutional connection by Siavelis, Peter  M.
www.ssoar.info
Crisis of representation in Chile?: the institutional
connection
Siavelis, Peter M.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Siavelis, P. . M. (2016). Crisis of representation in Chile?: the institutional connection. Journal of Politics in Latin
America, 8(3), 61-93. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10047
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Journal of Politics in 
Latin America 
 
 
Political Representation in Contemporary Chile 
 
 
Siavelis, Peter M. (2016),  
Crisis of Representation in Chile? The Institutional Connection, in: Journal of 
Politics in Latin America, 8, 3, 61–93. 
 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10047 
 
ISSN: 1868-4890 (online), ISSN: 1866-802X (print) 
 
The online version of this article can be found at: <www.jpla.org> 
 
 
 
Published by  
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies 
and Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Politics in Latin America is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ilas@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.jpla.org> 
 
The Journal of Politics in Latin America is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also 
includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. 
 
  Journal of Politics in Latin America 3/2016: 61–93    
 
Crisis of Representation in Chile?  
The Institutional Connection 
Peter M. Siavelis  
Abstract: This article analyzes the challenges to democratic representa-
tion in contemporary Chile, with an institutional focus. I argue that the 
post-authoritarian model of politics was deeply constrained by institu-
tions and practices inherited by democratic authorities and reinforced by 
the model of transitional politics and its series of informal institutions, 
which first facilitated, but then hindered democratic performance. While 
this does not point to a regime-threatening crisis, there are deep chal-
lenges to representation and a desire for a different model of politics that 
is more capable of resolving conflicts and satisfying citizen demands. I 
posit that, until now, Chile’s formal and informal institutions have privi-
leged stability over representation, accountability, and legitimacy. Conse-
quently, it has fallen to social movements to set the agenda for change 
aimed at addressing Chile’s deeper problems of political and social ine-
quality. I argue that institutional reforms are a necessary, yet insufficient, 
antidote to current challenges of representation.  
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, countless academic papers, conferences, and symposia 
have dealt with “crises of representation” around the world. While Chile 
is no exception, discussion of a crisis of representation in Chile might 
surprise long-time followers of the country’s politics. Chile’s “model” 
democratic transition, clean government, and remarkable stability made 
it the poster child of democracy for the first decade and a half following 
the transition to democracy that formally began with the 1988 plebiscite 
that effectively ended the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. In sharp 
contrast, Chile is now making headlines with the emergence of scandal 
after scandal, almost constant protests by students and representatives of 
other active social movements, plunging levels of public confidence in 
political parties and state institutions, and a generalized sense of perma-
nent political crisis without exit (Siavelis 2015). How do we explain this 
starkly changing political dynamic? Is there a crisis of representation in 
Chile? Does it matter whether what is occurring in the country is correct-
ly classified as a crisis of representation or not? What role do formal and 
informal institutions play in explaining this political crisis? 
This article1 seeks to answer these questions through an analysis of 
formal and informal institutions in Chile since the return of democracy. 
Fundamentally, I argue that the post-authoritarian model of politics was 
deeply constrained by institutions and practices that were inherited by 
democratic authorities and reinforced by the model of transitional poli-
tics and its series of informal institutions, which first facilitated, but then 
hindered democratic performance. This is territory that has been previ-
ously covered in the literature on Chile’s formal institutional structure 
and the informal institutions that grew up around it (Siavelis 2000; 2009). 
However, in terms of the contemporary challenges facing democracy in 
Chile, and in line with the assertions of most of the authors in this spe-
cial issue, I argue that Chile is not currently facing a regime-threatening 
crisis of representation. The point of this article is to go a step further to 
analyze the deep challenges to representation and point to a desire for a 
different form of representation and a model of politics that is better 
capable of resolving conflicts and satisfying citizen demands. The new 
contribution of this article is to underscore that there are multiple di-
mensions of democracy and that, to date, Chile’s institutions (both for-
mal and informal) have consistently privileged stability over representa-
tion, accountability, and legitimacy. It has been well established that 
                                                 
1  The author would like to acknowledge support from the Chilean Millennium 
Science Initiative (project NS130008) and Fondecyt Project 1160984.  
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within any democracy there are inherent tradeoffs between these goals 
(Pitkin 1967). However, the combination of Chile’s formal and informal 
institutional structure has consistently reinforced stability at the cost of 
these other essential elements of democracy. Given this context, it has 
fallen to social movements to set the agenda for change, with the aim of 
addressing Chile’s deeper problems of political and social inequality. 
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether these social movements or other 
groups and actors can reassume the strong representational role that has 
historically been played by parties in Chile. The article concludes by 
noting that while significant institutional reforms are necessary to restore 
a sense of legitimacy to Chilean democracy, such reforms will not be 
sufficient, given how deeply these challenges of representation have 
become ingrained in Chile’s body politic.2  
2 Democratic Transition, Protected  
Democracy Formal Political Institutions  
Chile’s post-authoritarian political and party context have deeply shaped 
politicians’ incentive structures and, in turn, the dynamic interaction 
between formal and informal institutions. First, in hindsight, it appears 
that the success of the democratic transition was guaranteed. This ig-
nores real threats to democracy (including a number of military mobiliza-
tion) and tense civil military relations at times (Weeks 2003). While dem-
ocratic transitions in many Latin American countries have been preceded 
by the relative weakening of the military, in Chile the military remained 
an important actor and was able to dictate the institutional conditions of 
its departure (Linz and Stepan 1996: 205–218). Indeed, the first post-
authoritarian president, Patricio Aylwin, noted that Pinochet “always 
thought we were going to fail and that the country was going to call him 
back to replace me.”3 Angell noted that, during this time “[t]here seemed 
to be two parallel systems of power in Chile, one democratic” and “an-
other a carryover from the authoritarian past posing a veiled threat to the 
                                                 
2  Survey data shows some contradictions on this point, as support for democracy 
in the country has been moderately increasing at a time when these challenges 
to representation are growing and support for basic institutions is falling. Still, 
support for democracy is relatively low in cross-national perspective and much 
lower for the masses than for elites, as shown in several surveys (including the 
IDRC UDP project that measured elite vs. citizen opinions). See LAPOP 
(2012) and UDP-IDRC (2014).  
3  Interview, 20 August 2008.  
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civilian authorities – in Pinochet’s words, a sleeping lion” (Angell 
2007: 147). 
Second, despite some limited reforms in the early years of democra-
cy and substantial reforms in 2005, Chile is still ruled by the 1980 Consti-
tution it inherited from the dictatorship. The Constitution has been con-
sistently criticized for its origins, given that its drafting commission was 
comprised of handpicked regime representatives. In addition, the plebi-
scite in which it was approved has been criticized for its questionable 
probity and tight government control over the process. The origins of 
the constitution regularly led scholars and politicians to characterize 
Chilean democracy as “limited,” “low-intensity,” “protected,” or “tute-
lary” (Huneeus 2014; Roberts 1998; Shain and Linz 1992). Analysis of 
Chilean politics during the transition rarely came without qualifying ad-
jectives, even entering popular debates on the nature and quality of Chil-
ean democracy (Tanner 2001). While some have objected to this charac-
terization (Rabkin 1992), most analysts recognize the strong limits to 
representation embodied in the 1980 Constitution.  
Consequently, while elites in most political systems craft institutions 
to serve their own interests, actors with strong political agendas have 
imposed institutions. The major elements of Chile’s 1980 Constitution 
were designed to enhance stability, but simultaneously provide limits on 
the scope of actions of democratic. In keeping with the arguments of 
this article, while the Constitution undoubtedly enhanced stability, it did 
so at the cost of other important dimension of democracy like represen-
tation, accountability, and legitimacy. Because these elements of the 
Constitution have been analyzed in depth elsewhere, I will only provide 
broad outlines as they impact the argument of this article.4 The 1980 
Constitution provided for exaggeratedly strong presidential systems; 
effective veto power for the armed forces; the establishment of a strong 
and military-dominated National Security Council; a military insulated 
from civilian control with respect to hiring, firing and promotions; a 
Constitutional Tribunal with the ability to derail legislation at any point 
in the legislative process; and a provision that nine of 39 senators would 
be appointed by the military or other forces sympathetic to the right for 
much of the transitional period. 
Third, one the most essential elements of the military government’s 
exercise in constitutional engineering was the design of a new legislative 
election system that aimed to transform the party system and reduce the 
                                                 
4  For a fuller discussion of these features of the constitution, see Siavelis (2000: 
1–42) and Barros (2002). 
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power and influence of the left. The military-designed system (which 
became known as the binomial system) provided that each coalition 
could present two candidates on open lists. Although voters chose a 
candidate, votes were pooled to determine whether lists won one or two 
seats. The highest polling coalition in a district could only win both seats 
if it more than doubled the vote total of the second-placed list – provid-
ing effective thresholds of 33 percent for a one seat victory and 66 per-
cent for a two seat victory. It was rare for a list to reach the 66 percent 
threshold, so one seat effectively went to each of the two coalitions. 
Because the Concertación’s level of electoral support has hovered around 
55 percent and the Alianza’s at around 40 percent, in functional terms 
the coalitions simply divided seats in most districts, providing an elec-
toral bonus for the right (winning 50 percent of the seats with only 35–
40 percent of the vote). The system also succeeded in marginalizing the 
non-Concertación left, or any small party that failed or refused to strike an 
electoral bargain with one of the two major coalitions (Navia 2005; Ra-
hat and Sznajder 1998). Although there is substantial evidence that the 
election system was specifically designed to favor right-wing parties (Pol-
ga-Hecimovich and Siavelis 2015), other analysts have pointed to the 
broad proportionality of the election system (Zucco 2007). However, it 
is important to note that this proportionality did not grow out of the 
dynamics of the electoral system, but was actually manufactured by the 
alliance system and the process of candidate selection, whereby larger 
parties made room for smaller ones on joint electoral lists for strategic 
reasons (Polga-Hecimovich and Siavelis 2015). Although the binomial 
system was abandoned in 2015 to be replaced by a moderate PR system 
for the 2017 elections, it has deeply shaped post-authoritarian political 
competition. 
While some of these features of the constitution stand out for their 
blatant intention to limit representation or favor the right, others may 
seem not too far removed from constitutional norms, in a cross-national 
perspective. Nonetheless, in Chile it is the combination of all these features 
that really provided a “constitutional straightjacket” for democratic au-
thorities, making it difficult to govern (given the party system and limits 
on Congress) and almost impossible to reform this difficult framework. 
Undoubtedly, and as Fuentes (2014) correctly noted, there were im-
portant constitutional reforms. In this sense, the institutional rigidity 
noted here did not impede the approval of some significant political 
transformations. However, these were largely due to the structure of 
incentives that prompted the right to support some reform initiatives as 
it stopped benefiting from the rules of the game it had designed.  
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Fourth, despite the military’s effort to transform Chile’s multiparty 
system, it emerged with many of the same characteristics and a similar 
number of parties that it had before the dictatorship. A distinctive fea-
ture of the post-authoritarian system is the existence of two main coali-
tions that have contested the six presidential and congressional elections 
since the return to democracy. The center-left Concertación coalition 
(which grew from the “No” forces in the 1988 plebiscite) comprised the 
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), the Partido Socialista (PS), the 
Partido por la Democracia (PPD), and the smaller Partido Radical (PR) 
and Partido Social Demócrata (PSD). The latter two parties merged in 
1994 to form the Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD). In 2013, the 
alliance was redubbed Nueva Mayoría and continued to have the four 
traditional parties (PDC, PS, PPD, PRSD), but also included the Partido 
Comunista de Chile (PCCh), Izquierda Ciudadana (IC), and the Mo-
vimiento Amplio Social (MAS). On the right, the Alianza coalition was 
composed of two major parties – Renovación Nacional (RN) and the 
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) – with the exception of the 
1993 election when the Unión de Centro (UCC) also joined the Alianza. 
The UDI was more closely associated with allies of the dictatorship and 
is considered more conservative than RN, whose roots lie in Chile’s 
traditional aristocratic right.  
A key point about this type of party system is that it exists within 
the context of presidentialism. The Chilean case has occupied a central 
role in the debate on the performance of presidentialism. The executive–
legislative deadlock and immobilism that brought Chilean democracy to 
an end in 1973 made it the poster child for opponents of presidential 
systems (Linz and Valenzuela 1994). With the return to democracy, Chile 
remained emblematic as its widely heralded formula for power sharing 
within the context of the democratic transition also made it a model for 
cross-party coalition-making under presidentialism (Siavelis 2000).  
In essence, Chilean elites faced a delicate and potentially precarious 
democratic transition with a strong military headed by the dictator who 
headed the outgoing government. They did so within an institutional 
framework that was not of their own design and was unquestionably 
awkward, both with respect to the tensions created by presidentialism in 
a multiparty context and in terms of the incentives for interparty cooper-
ation. Furthermore, a multiparty system continued to exist in an institu-
tional configuration and electoral system designed to limit the number of 
parties and representation. Constitutional and institutional reform was an 
essential imperative, but one made difficult for most of the transitional 
period by the institutional straightjacket that was the legacy of the dicta-
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torship. The way in which elites constructed mechanisms to deal with 
this complex context was key to the success of the democratic transition, 
but also key to understanding the disaffection with parties and institu-
tions (and potentially the crisis of representation) that exists in Chile 
today. Indeed, the two are intimately related.  
3 Informal Institutions and Democratic  
Governance  
How did the Concertación deal with these manifold challenges within the 
context described here? Formal institutions were clearly inadequate to 
build the kind of consensus necessary to govern Chile and avoid conflict 
in the immediate post-authoritarian period. Political elites constructed a 
series of informal institutions to deal with these challenges. 
The development of literature on political institutions has been rich. 
Analysts of institutions in Latin America have uncovered robust and 
convincing relations between particular sets of institutions and the types 
of behaviors they are said to encourage. In recent years, there has been 
increasing recognition of the importance of informal institutions in Latin 
American politics (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Although the notion of 
“informality” has long been present, it is most often expressed in terms 
of the negative consequences of nepotism, patron–client relations, cor-
poratism, and patrimonialism (Hagopian 1993; Hillman 1994; Wiarda 
and Kline 1996, among many others). Nonetheless, newer literature has 
gone beyond the usual negative litany to recognize that informal institu-
tions can play a positive role. Indeed, without informal institutions it is 
likely the Chile’s democratic transition would not have been as success-
ful. What are informal institutions and what role have they played in 
politics in Chile since the return of democracy?  
Helmke and Levitsky defined informal institutions as “socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside officially sanction channels” (2006: 5). They went on to 
emphasize that, contrary to some earlier definitions, it is important that 
there is a form of credible sanction in order for an informal institution to 
be considered as such. They provided a typology of informal institutions, 
reproduced in Table 1, based on whether or not effective formal institu-
tions exist and whether the outcomes of the informal institutions con-
verge or diverge from those that would occur with the simple operation 
of formal institutions. It should be noted that effectiveness signifies the 
extent to which rules and practices that exist on paper are complied with 
or expected to be enforced (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 13).  
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Table 1. A Typology of Informal Institutions 
Outcomes Effective Formal Insti-
tutions 
Ineffective Formal Insti-
tutions 
Convergent Complementary Substitutive
Divergent Accommodating Competing
 
In the Chilean case, most of the informal institutions that emerged or 
were constructed were complementary and accommodating. Because 
Chile’s democratic institutions were imposed, elites had enhanced incen-
tives to create informal institutions to enable them to achieve goals with-
in an ill-fitting institutional framework that militates against many of 
their fundamental interests. This has led to a proliferation of informal 
institutions that both contravene the unquestionably inflexible formal 
institutions and enable politicians to work within them. Indeed, the com-
parative institutional literature suggests that Chile’s exaggerated presiden-
tial system, majoritarian electoral formula, timing and sequencing of 
elections, and other institutional variables combine for a very undesirable 
configuration and should create disincentives for cooperation and politi-
cal accommodation (Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). None-
theless, scholars and political leaders in the region have recognized that 
Chile’s democratic transition and record of governability are among the 
most successful on the continent. This is due largely to the development 
of informal institutions. However, as will be further developed in this 
article, the perseverance of these institutions also explains some of the 
discontent with current forms of representation that we see today in 
Chile.5 
3.1  El Cuoteo and Joint Electoral Lists 
Coalition maintenance was recognized as central to governing success in 
Chile – so central, indeed, that the future of the democratic transition 
rode on it. A memo circulated by the first general secretary of govern-
ment read:  
                                                 
5  A good portion of the analysis presented here is based on previously published 
works and arguments (Siavelis 2009). However, that work presented four of 
these elements of informality as “enclaves” of the democratic transition rather 
than informal institutions as presented here. While discussed as “enclaves” as 
part of that previous work, they still fit the definition of informal institutions 
and are considered as such here.  
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The fear of a military regression, and the understanding of the risk 
of such an event occurring, will be directly determined by the level 
of conflict that exists between political parties. (Boeninger 1989) 
To avoid this type of problem, Concertación leaders created two sets of 
power sharing arrangements. First, at the level of the executive branch, 
Concertación leaders struck an informal agreement known as the cuoteo, 
which endured throughout all of the post-authoritarian governments 
from the Patricio Aylwin administration (1990–1994) until the two Bach-
elet administrations (2006–2010 and 2014–present). Dávila’s (2011) 
comprehensive study outlined the basics of this informal institution. 
Concertación elites agreed on three points: (1) that cabinet positions would 
be distributed proportionally in line with parties’ electoral weight in legis-
lative elections; (2) the major parties would be underrepresented to pro-
vide space for representatives of smaller parties that were needed to hold 
the coalition together; and (3) that the principle of transversalidad would 
be employed – meaning that cabinet ministers would be from a different 
party than vice ministers where feasible.  
Transversalidad was respected by all four of the administrations ana-
lyzed by Dávila: (with the minister and sub-secretary being of a different 
party in 78 percent of the cases for Aylwin, 71 percent of the cases for 
Frei, 87 percent of the cases for Lagos, and 96 percent of the cases for 
Bachelet). Furthermore, throughout the ministries, and particularly in the 
“political” ministries, each of the post-authoritarian administrations 
sought to balance the representation of the complete constellation of 
members of the Concertación coalition in the upper-level staffs of each of 
the ministries (Dávila 2011; Rehren 1992).  
Second, elites also faced a power-sharing dilemma at the electoral 
level. The reality that there were many parties in the coalition and only 
two seats available in each of the country’s 60 electoral districts compli-
cated coalition building and maintenance. This puzzle led to a series of 
informal institutions and rules that respond to the well-understood in-
centives created by the electoral system. In general terms, the number of 
seats each party received was tied to performance in past elections; there-
fore, logic would dictate the simple division of candidacies based on the 
percentage of vote a particular party polled in previous elections. How-
ever, the system created a good deal of strategic complexity. With district 
magnitudes of two, a minor party candidate paired with a major party 
candidate often stands to lose. At the same time, those minor parties are 
crucial in order for coalitions to rally sufficient support for them to pass 
thresholds nationally and be sure of maintaining single coalitional presi-
dential candidacies. Thus, minor party candidates are often paired with 
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weaker party partners; this logic is counterintuitive, but makes sense. It 
means that candidates capable of garnering the highest number of votes 
in a particular district may not be placed on electoral lists.6 Even major 
party candidates will lobby to be placed either with very strong coalition 
partners that will allow them to pass the 66 percent threshold, or with 
weak partners who will contribute enough votes to pass the 33 percent 
threshold without outpolling them. Thus, these strategic pairings, which 
evolved into informal institutions, contravened the mechanical tenden-
cies of the electoral system, effectively providing for the representation 
of the full range of the coalition’s parties in Congress and allowed parties 
and candidates to simultaneously achieve divergent goals.  
3.2 Electoral Insurance for Good Losers 
In addition to making candidate selection complex, the binomial system 
also presents a risk distribution problem, whereby the collective goals of 
an electoral coalition diverged from the goals of candidates.7 Given that 
a coalition can win two seats by arriving at 66 percent, coalitions will 
naturally seek to win both seats whenever they can. However, this is 
really quite difficult.8 Coalition leaders identified districts where doubling 
is possible and targeted electoral resources at such districts to attempt 
cross the critical threshold. If the possibility of doubling is there, coali-
tions place their two strongest candidates in that district. This coalitional 
goal conflicts directly with individual candidate goals because candidates 
seek to avoid strong competition from within their own list in order to 
concentrate on beating the opposing list. The possibility of miscalcula-
tion is high, as is the risk of loss for a candidate running with a strong 
partner. In addition, in order for a coalition to receive the highest num-
ber of votes possible that will allow it to double, it must choose the 
strongest candidates, whose qualities and popularity make it possible to 
push the coalition across the 66 percent threshold. Thus, the coalition 
wants two very strong and popular candidates, while an individual candi-
date has every reason to prefer a weak list partner. Even in a more com-
mon district, where a coalition is willing to settle for the one-one split 
                                                 
6  Siavelis (2002) provided a complete discussion of the differing incentives for 
candidate selection related to party size. 
7  This section draws heavily on Carey and Siavelis (2005). 
8  In the seven elections since the return of democracy, coalitions have been able 
to achieve “doblajes” the following number of times for the House of Deputies: 
1989 – 12; 1994 – 11; 1997 – 11; 2001 – 4; 2005 – 6; 2009 – 1; 2013 – 11.  
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between first- and second-place lists, candidates still need partners to 
maximize list votes.  
So how do coalitions provide incentives for candidates to run in 
risky elections or ones in which they are almost guaranteed to lose? Car-
ey and Siavelis (2005) argued for an informal institution where parties 
provide rewards or consolation prizes for those losing candidates willing 
to incur risk on behalf of the coalition in the form of the awarding of 
government positions following the election; this would again allow 
parties and coalitions to simultaneously achieve their divergent electoral 
goals.  
While this electoral insurance was central to maintaining the coali-
tion and easing the transition to democracy by providing a consensus 
building dynamic, it has unintended consequences related to the central 
argument of this article. The reality that incumbents and major candi-
dates on each list consistently had high expectation of winning, and even 
losers were exposed to low levels of risk, meant that candidates were 
effectively insulated from the reality of changing citizen demands. The 
electoral insurance provided enough stability in the upper levels of each 
party for candidates to rarely fear for their survival, and stability again 
trumped representation.  
3.3 The Partido Transversal 
The partido transversal was an informal group of politicians in the first 
democratic governments who defined themselves more as “leaders of 
the Concertación” rather than leaders of their individual parties. Despite 
the partido transversal’s lack of formal organization, the actors themselves 
knew who they were and structured informal relationships among them-
selves, between their parties and the coalition, and, as discussed later, 
with social actors. During the first three Concertación administrations, the 
policy-making process was dominated by executive branch elites belong-
ing to the partido transversal. Ignacio Walker, who served in the Ministry of 
the General Presidency (SEGPRES) under President Patricio Aylwin, 
noted that the partido’s members  
correspond to informal networks that have […] exercised a strong 
influence under the three administrations of the Concertación, both 
in terms of strategic design and the set of public policies that have 
been pursued. (Walker 2003: 5) 
It played a crucial role in structuring myriad relationships: between min-
istries, between ministries and congressional leaders, and between the 
government and social groups with whom negotiations were undertaken 
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to strike agreements that would be acceptable to powerful social actors. 
Towards the end of the Frei administration, however, the partido transver-
sal ceased to function. This was testament to the deteriorating condition 
of the Concertación coalition and the reality that the precariousness of 
democracy was less daunting, which allowed cracks to emerge in the 
coalition. Still, in the early and sensitive years of the transition, it served 
as important political wiring to ensure communication and elite policy 
coordination.  
3.4 Democracia de los acuerdos 
Concertación leaders faced a difficult legislative scenario. On one hand, 
there were demands for profound change and transformation in relation 
to the most egregious elements of economic and social inequality, which 
were a product of Pinochet’s two-tiered legacy in the area of social pro-
vision. Democratic authorities inherited profoundly unequal health, edu-
cation, and retirement systems, where the wealthy had access to high-
quality services while the poor were left to rely on underfunded and 
inferior public services. In addition, a reactionary labor code and regres-
sive tax code further contributed to inequality, which was arguably the 
country’s most pressing problem. However, at the same time, veto play-
ers on the right, including the military, parties of the right (who were 
institutionally overrepresented), the business community, and large eco-
nomic conglomerates provided clear and stated limits on the extent of 
acceptable change. Unsettling Chile’s growing economy or fundamentally 
challenging the market economic model were strictly off-limits and could 
provide a potential rationale for renewed military intervention. At the 
same time, although trade unions and other popular organizations had 
been gutted during the dictatorship, there were also demands for change 
on the left, putting Concertación governments in a difficult position.  
Within this context, leaders had to find a way to legislate while 
maintaining consensus between agents of change and veto players. The 
Concertación struck a bargain with veto players on the right, which includ-
ed a tacit agreement that the president should negotiate with powerful 
economic actors and leaders on the right, such as business associations 
and producer groups, to craft agreements before legislation was intro-
duced in Congress. This model, dubbed democracia de los acuerdos (democ-
racy by agreement), was used in reforming the tax code, expanding social 
welfare and anti-corruption legislation, and in the comprehensive consti-
tutional reforms of 2005 (Boylan 1996; Silva 1992). Negotiated agree-
ments outside Congress were the norm between the Concertación and its 
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allies, such as trade unions, aimed at securing the democratic transition 
by avoiding potentially destabilizing demands.  
This model facilitated the transition and the legislative agendas of 
presidents. However, it also sidelined voters, providing little opportunity 
for citizen input, projecting the image of democracy by inter-elite negoti-
ation. In addition, and as will be stressed below, by avoiding controver-
sial legislation it is likely that elites also neglected necessary reforms and 
are paying the price today with high levels of popular dissatisfaction.  
3.5 Informal Presidential Advisory Networks 
It seems logical that presidents would appointment members of their 
inner circle to ministerial positions in order to be able to rely on trusted 
advisors and initiators of policy. However, the cuoteo limited presidents’ 
choices of advisors, given that they had to take more variables into con-
sideration when appointing ministers. It was not just a case of ensuring 
that the cuoteo and transversalidad were respected; presidents also increas-
ingly had to take into account variables of age, gender, and previous 
ministerial service (that is, as time progressed there were increasing de-
mands to appoint new faces). Facing fewer of these limits and really only 
thinking of party parity, Patricio Aylwin appointed ministers who were 
also his trusted advisers, within SEGPRES (the Ministry of the General 
Secretary of the Presidency) at the center coordinating inter-party rela-
tions across ministries. Eduardo Frei respected the formal cuoteo for min-
isterial appointments, but relied on a just a few key ministers, who be-
came known as his círculo de hierro (iron circle) with less consultative rela-
tions. President Lagos opted to abide by the formality of the cuoteo, but 
moved his most important advisers to a newly created unit of informal 
advisers known as the Segundo Piso (or “Second Floor,” named after the 
location of their offices in the Moneda presidential palace near the presi-
dent’s office). Finally, Michelle Bachelet, who faced a far more complex 
constellation of variables in respecting the cuoteo (given its additional 
complex constraints related to age, service and gender, which emerged 
with the passage of time), could rely on few trusted advisers within or 
outside of the ministries, for a variety of reasons; this resulted in less 
than complete cross-party consultation (Siavelis 2016).  
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3.6 National–Local Accommodative Mechanisms 
Valenzuela’s (1977) seminal study of pre-authoritarian Chile puzzled over 
how political parties in a country as ideologically divided as Chile could 
find common cause to avoid complete disintegration of the political 
system and the emergence of polarized pluralism common in highly 
divided party systems. He identified a series of accommodative informal 
mechanisms that enabled parties to work together. In the context of 
Chile’s hyper-centralized political system, all power radiated from Santia-
go. Under the guise of exchanging favors for political loyalty and voting, 
local officials functioned as power brokers to facilitate the distribution of 
resources between national political leaders (deputies and senators) and 
voters. Likewise, local leaders (mayors and councilors) benefited from 
national-level brokers by getting resources from them to meet constitu-
ent demands. Networks of personal relationships built between brokers 
and national level politicians and between brokers and voters helped 
moderate potential ideological conflicts.  
However, in the post-authoritarian period, the 1980 Constitution 
specifically proscribed the ability of legislators to propose particularistic 
proposals that aimed to extract resources for their districts, effectively 
eliminating what had been an important tool of accommodation. Toro 
(2013) underscored the changing nature of local–national connections 
under the 1980 Constitution, given the lower capacity of members of 
Congress to promote leyes particulares and extract resources. Under this 
new schema, however, mayors still have the ability to satisfy the de-
mands of the electorate without legislative action. In essence, local offi-
cials now contact legislators to plead for selective intervention in the 
ministries to gain favors and extract resources, and legislators comply 
because they want to maintain an electoral connection to their districts 
and be able to claim credit. This is the case despite the fact that Article 
57 of the Constitution specifically proscribes legislative intervention in 
the bureaucracy. Still, this evolving informal institution has eased what is 
still excessive centralization of the political system and has mediated 
potential conflict between local and national politicians (Toro 2013). 
4 Democracy, Informal Institutions, and  
Political Crisis in Chile: La otra cara de la 
moneda  
Faced with manifold challenges, Chilean elites were able to successfully 
construct informal institutions of accommodation and consensus build-
  Crisis of Representation in Chile? 75
 

 
ing that, for a while, made the Chilean transition a model in the region. 
All of the informal institutions outlined here were functional and con-
tributed to the success of the democratic transition and the relative sta-
bility of post-authoritarian governments. That was the case until around 
2006, when student protests abruptly erupted followed by increasing 
mobilization and activism of a variety of social movements. An almost 
constant stream of corruption scandals followed, creating the generalized 
sense of permanent crisis that characterizes Chile today. This crisis is 
also reflected in a precipitous decline in support for Chile’s institutions, 
and its party system and political parties in particular. Table 2 presents an 
evaluation of political institutions in the country, showing a general lack 
of support for any type of institution. Even the top-rated institutions 
(like the generic “church” and the particular “church parish”) only rate at 
the top end of “a little” and do not really approach “a lot.”  
Table 2.  Mean Confidence in Chilean Institutions 
 Confidence (Rated 1 to 4) 
(1 = none, 2 = a little, 3 = some, 4 = a lot) 
Political Parties  1.74 
The Senate 1.85 
The Courts  1.86 
The Chamber of Deputies 1.87 
Ministers  1.97 
Businesspeople  1.98 
Your Senator 1.98 
Your Deputy  1.99 
The Government 2.09 
Journalists  2.13 
The President of the Republic  2.18 
The Media  2.22 
Unions  2.28 
Local Government  2.28 
The Catholic Church  2.29 
Your Mayor 2.30 
The Police 2.40 
The Armed Forces 2.45 
Your Church  2.66 
Your Church Parish  2.74 
Source:  PNUD (2014). 
While political parties are at the bottom of the barrel when it comes to 
the evaluation of institutions, other national-level institutions are equally 
poorly rated, including both legislative chambers, the courts, and minis-
ters. Indeed, even businesspeople – who are relatively highly rated in 
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some industrial democracies like the United States – rank low, along with 
Congress and ministers. 
The decline in levels of partisan self-identification deserves special 
mention. Historically, Chile was said to resemble Europe more than 
Latin America when it came to political parties. Political parties were 
central actors in Chilean political life, with high levels of institutionaliza-
tion, permanence, and citizen identification. Parties were the main inter-
locutors between citizens and elites (Garretón 1989; Valenzuela 1978). 
Indeed, immediately following the democratic transition, several analysts 
noted that Chile emerged barely transformed from the dictatorship with 
respect to the role of political parties (Scully and Valenzuela 1997; 
Siavelis 1997). Indeed, throughout the early years of the transition, par-
ties continued to play their traditional roles, with high levels of popular 
support, allowing them to remain major political interlocutors. However, 
as Figure 1 shows, levels of identification with parties rapidly started to 
erode from 1992 on. While support for and identification with political 
parties has decreased cross-nationally, the speed and magnitude of the 
decline in Chile is remarkable.  
It is no coincidence that this steep erosion in partisan identification 
occurred at the same time as increasing evidence of a developing par-
tidocracia and signs of the cutting of historical connections between citi-
zens and parties (Luna and Altman 2011). This decline in self-identifica-
tion can partly be explained by the dynamics in the evolution of politics 
in Chile outlined here. By abandoning their historic representational 
roles, citizens began to view parties as corrupt, less than honest, and 
overly concerned with internal partisan struggles (Carlin 2014). Adding 
to the mix, an ideology of maintaining coalitional and transitional stabil-
ity, combined with an electoral system that minimizes the importance of 
citizens’ electoral choices, limited the ability to hold politicians accounta-
ble and ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the party system.  
What explains the stark contrast between Chile’s “model” demo-
cratic transition and a country plagued by a sense of permanent crisis and 
low levels of satisfaction? Objectively and superficially, one might think 
that Chileans should be among the most satisfied with their political 
system. Chile has experienced remarkable levels of economic growth and 
is the only South American country in the OECD. Given its relatively 
higher levels of development, a long-standing reputation (until recently 
challenged) of clean politics and political institutions with a high degree 
of effectiveness, one might think Chileans would be satisfied. What is 
wrong with Chile? 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Citizen Self-Identification with Political Parties in 
Chile  
 
Source:  PNUD 2014: 289. 
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Undoubtedly, and as other analyses have shown, part of Chileans dissat-
isfaction certainly rests with frustration at high levels of inequality. How-
ever, it is probably incorrect to tie the roots of increasing dissatisfaction 
and social mobilization solely to inequality. After all, inequality has been 
historically high in Chile. Such a univariate explanation, in the context of 
the analyses presented here, ignores two vital realities. First, while ine-
quality is not new since the transition, societal perceptions regarding 
justice and injustice have changed. Increasingly arguments about justice 
and fundamental fairness are wrapped up in discussions about inequality. 
The most visible result of the paucity of reforms was glaring inequality 
and an enduring sense that there are “two Chiles.” One consists of a 
minority that benefited from the post-transition economic boom and is 
able to rely on privatized health, education, and retirement systems. The 
other, though undisputable richer than it was and successfully wrenched 
from poverty, has not shared equally in the economic largess of Chile’s 
boom years and cannot take advantage of higher-quality privatized social 
support schemes. As Chileans realize the fruits of the Pinochet reforms, 
these perceptions of unfairness have only been reinforced.  
For example, college admission in Chile is based almost exclusively 
on the Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU) (Chile’s version of the US’s 
SAT), generally with a required score of above 600 points (out of a pos-
sible 850) for entrance to the most desired programs and elite universi-
ties. Nonetheless, while fee-paying private high schools graduate only 
about 9 percent of Chilean students, they make up roughly 60 percent of 
those that receive this score, meaning that both sets of elite universities 
are fed by equally elite private high schools (Elacqua 2013). The deck is 
further stacked against disadvantaged students by the fact that around a 
million university students have taken advantage of funding scheme like 
the state-financed Crédito con Aval del Estado. This system was put into 
effect in 2006 with the noble intentions of enhancing educational access 
for middle-class and poorer Chileans by providing a system of state-
sponsored subsidized loans. However, university graduates then often 
found themselves un-employed, under-employed, and deeply in debt. 
Indeed, the recently adopted plan for free education for the poorest 
university candidates has only raised the ire of these students and led to 
demands for debt forgiveness. It is probably no coincidence that student 
protests intensified once the first payments came due. Perceptions of 
unfairness have been further reinforced as police repression has been 
employed to counteract these demonstrations based on legitimate claims 
of injustice.  
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Second, politics is about more than content; it is also about the pro-
cess. I contend that part of Chile’s political crisis is explained by the 
perseverance of a political model that is left over from the transition, but 
has outlived its usefulness. Indeed, I would go even further and argue 
that the actual informal institutions that have been at the root of the 
success of the Chilean transition have also contributed to the erosion of 
support for the country’s political institutions and processes. In essence, 
all the informal institutions outlined here were functional and contribut-
ed to the success of Chile’s model democratic transition, but they repre-
sent a double-edged sword. The success of the Concertación coalition (and, 
in turn, the democratic transition) was based on a complex and negotiat-
ed power-sharing formula. This facilitated cooperation, consensus-build-
ing, and coalition maintenance. However, these very same arrangements 
in the long-term brought charges of elite domination and politics by 
quota. The binomial election systems provided strong incentives for 
coalition formation, but in the process provided Chile’s two major coali-
tions with an effective lock on power. Citizens increasingly perceived 
that voting mattered little because each major coalition was given an 
effective assurance of one of the two seats in each electoral district. The 
sharing of electoral spoils through negotiated assignment of legislative 
candidacies guaranteed peace between Chile’s parties, but could only be 
undertaken through elite selection of candidates and precluded signifi-
cant citizen input. The cuoteo was an ingenious power sharing arrange-
ment that provided widespread input into policy making, legislative suc-
cess for president, and relative cross-party peace. However, the cuoteo 
increasingly came to have a bad name, as Chileans perceived it was polit-
ical connections rather than talent determining who would be named to 
head ministries. Evidence of consolation prizes for electoral losers only 
reinforced this image. Indeed, all of the political process analyzed here 
also play into the justice and fairness argument, as these political pro-
cesses are seen to have reinforced injustice and the status quo.  
Chile’s highly institutionalized parties are credited with underwriting 
the success of the democratic transition and the stability of Chilean de-
mocracy. However, while party institutionalization provided presidents 
workable legislative majorities, strong parties, and powerful party leader-
ship, party elites dominate decision making and candidate selection, with 
little citizen input. With respect to the policy-making process, party 
elites, in concert with the president, bypassed Congress to strike legisla-
tive deals with major social actors and veto players before they were 
presented to Congress. This promoted an image of less-than-transparent 
deal-making and politiquería. This image was reinforced by cozy relations 
  80 Peter M. Siavelis 
 
between members of Congress and local politicians that aimed to extract 
resources. Finally, when it comes to economic change, given this political 
model, elites avoided destabilizing change, but have been loath to ad-
dress deep public dissatisfaction by engaging in any reform of any of the 
fundamentals of the economic system inherited from Pinochet.9  
5 A “Crisis of Representation” or Demands 
for a New Form of Representation? …… 
and the Limits of Institutional Reform 
Representative democracy is defined by the existence of mechanisms to 
channel public will into policy by way of a smaller number of elected 
representatives, mediated by intermediate-level groups and primarily 
political parties. For most of Chile’s democratic history, representation 
took place by way of mass-based ideological parties that sought to mobi-
lize the citizenry (Gil 1966). Citizen commitments to parties tended to be 
consistent with established cleavages in society and correspond to identi-
fiable socio-economic or other types of social divisions. Parties relied on 
hierarchical structures that employed party organizations and party activ-
ists to carry out the functions scholars and citizens associated with politi-
cal parties, including interest representation, interest articulation, political 
recruitment, and political communication.  
This model of representation no longer exists in Chile. In the last 
five years, major issues have not been put on the table by political par-
ties, but rather through the vocal demands of social movements. While 
Concertación leaders often avoided controversial reforms or came to the 
table with incremental reforms, more substantial reform initiatives have 
been forced on to the agenda by more assertive social movements and 
protests. While this dynamic is most notable in the area of educational 
reforms, it has also been the case for gender-progressive legislation, 
divorce, birth control, abortion, and gay marriage. This suggests that the 
pattern of democracia de los consensos and inter-elite accommodation no 
longer satisfy the Chilean public, and nor do the resultant reforms that 
have emerged from this pattern of politics.  
This account of changing patterns of representation points to a cen-
tral contradiction. One could conclude that parties in Chile have been 
weakened. However, parties and considerations of party identification 
are central in determining which posts people receive, where parliamen-
                                                 
9  This section draws heavily on Siavelis (2009). 
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tary candidates run, and how the spoils of Chile’s coalition government 
are distributed. In writing on pre-Chavez Venezuela, Coppedge contend-
ed that “the institutions that make Venezuela a stable polity also tarnish 
the quality of its democracy” (Coppedge 1994: 2). Coppedge noted that 
Venezuela’s highly institutionalized parties had come to completely dom-
inate the political system in the form of a “partyarchy” or partidocracia. 
Similarly, while parties in Chile are strong and influential at the elite level, 
they increasingly lack the deep roots in society that characterized parties 
in the past and have been recognized as central to effective party repre-
sentation (Luna and Altman 2011). Partidocracia may well be emerging in 
Chile.  
This reality suggests that regardless of whether a crisis of represen-
tation exists, there are deep challenges to representation and Chileans are 
clearly seeking new forms of representation.10 What these new forms 
might look like is subject to disagreement. They might include popular 
mobilization, social media, referenda, or a rehabilitation of parties so 
they can return to reassume their past functions. (A complete discussion 
of new forms of representation is beyond the scope of this article.) In 
this sense, Hagopian’s argument from almost two decades ago seem 
prescient and still relevant (1998). She pointed to the decline of corporat-
ism and electoral dealignment in Latin America as challenges to tradi-
tional forms of representation, noting the difficulty that NGOs and 
mobilized voluntary organizations have had in assuming the representa-
tional roles previously played by parties. Indeed, she noted a good degree 
of uncertainty about whether the institutions and organizations noted 
above would be able to replace parties in performing this representation-
al function. Tellingly, that uncertainty still remains.  
Given the challenges to the resurrection noted here, is there any po-
tential way out of this representational conundrum? Because the focus of 
this article is institutions, what sort of institutional transformations have 
the potential to address these new demands for representation? Are 
institutional solutions enough? What role will political parties play?  
  
                                                 
10  It is true that, despite low identification with parties, Chileans continue to form 
new ones. Two realities probably explain this proliferation of new parties. First, 
it is well documented that it is difficult in a modern democracy to organize rep-
resentation via any other structure than political parties. Second, this is also a 
function of disgust with current parties and the reality that new parties are 
forming in anticipation of the additional space for parties that the new PR sys-
tem will provide.  
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5.1 Constitutional Reform? 
From the most basic perspective, many people (including many sitting 
politicians) have argued that constitutional reform is the answer. Because 
Chile’s current constitution is illegitimate in origin and not designed by 
the elites that must work within it, constitutional reform must be a cen-
tral ingredient to spawn new forms of more legitimate representation. A 
constitutional reform under the Lagos administration in 2005 made some 
important changes, including the elimination of appointed senators, the 
striking of the provision for a senate seat for life for past presidents, and 
the restoration of the president’s ability to dismiss commanders in chief 
of the armed forces. However, the basic structure of the Pinochet consti-
tution remains, with continuing limits on representation for particular 
groups, for trade unions, and strong guarantees on the sanctity of prop-
erty. This structure forms the outline for an extraordinary centralized 
form of strong presidentialism, where the legislature continues to be 
limited in its scope of action. It contains no guarantees for ethnic groups, 
nor does it provide many mechanisms for direct popular input in deci-
sion making. All of these elements have made it difficult for elites to 
respond to the demands of social movements. Perhaps most importantly 
for the process, the constitution provides for a two-thirds quorum for 
reform.  
The constitutional reform process currently involves two central 
questions: content and process. In terms of content, concrete reforms to 
enhance legitimacy and representation reform do not need to depart 
widely from Chile’s long constitutional tradition. However, from the 
most basic perspective, legitimacy rests on removing all of the vestiges of 
the military regime from the Constitution in order to provide legitimacy 
of origin. Moderating Chile’s strong and exaggerated presidentialism, 
with fewer powers for the president and enhanced powers for Congress, 
would be a good place to start. In addition, the current constitution pro-
vides for super-majorities that have incentivized extra-institutional nego-
tiations behind the scenes. Lower majorities for the passage of legislation 
and constitutional reform would help bring this process back into the 
realm of formal institutions.  
Proponents of deeper change have called for institutionally mandat-
ed representation for implicitly or explicitly marginalized and un-
derrepresented groups. They also want to take on Chile’s glaring inequal-
ities by including measures that guarantee socioeconomic rights includ-
ing health care, social welfare, education, and access to a secure retire-
ment, effectively challenging the current strong constitutional guarantee 
of property rights. It seems clear that no constitutional reform will result 
  Crisis of Representation in Chile? 83
 

 
in the re-making of what has become known as the “Chilean model” of 
market economics.  
In terms of process, President Bachelet has proposed an eight-step 
reform process that includes programs of civic education and popular 
dialogue, followed by the formulation of a draft constitution. However, 
the choice of the actual mechanism for reform has been delayed and will 
ultimately be determined by Congress. The four options are: (1) a bicam-
eral draft commission of deputies and senators; (2) a mixed constituent 
convention made up of members of Congress and the public; (3) a con-
stituent assembly; and (4) a plebiscite to choose which of the three above 
options will be employed.  
The decision to proceed with the reform in this way is strategic. 
Each option is controversial depending on the political sector. Advo-
cates of a constituent assembly contend that if reform is left to Congress 
the constitution will not be sufficiently changed to reflect the demands 
of social movements and include language that somehow expands socio-
economic rights to respond to Chile’s glaring inequalities. Opponents of 
a constituent assembly fear the opposite: that such an assembly will fall 
into a Chavista dynamic, creating chaos and threatening the economic 
model at the root of Chile’s success. Opponents of the constituent as-
sembly point to similar processes in Ecuador and Bolivia as evidence 
that these sorts of processes can get carried away. However, proponents 
of a constituent assembly have actually lauded these two processes as 
providing a politics of inclusion in societies where the exclusion of major 
social groups had been the norm since their foundation. These propo-
nents contend that such a process is the only one that will simultaneously 
take into account the demands of new social movements in Chile and 
include more representation for regions and localities, students, indige-
nous groups, trade unions, and the representatives of these same social 
movements.  
The outcome of this process is fraught with uncertainty, not least in 
terms of how the composition of Congress will be transformed as a 
result of electoral reform. Also, important veto powers remain. The right 
is opposed to deep reforms, and powerful economic groups, including 
business conglomerates and the mining sector will resist any efforts to 
challenge property rights. On the other hand, the sense of permanent 
crisis in Chile will not be resolved until some concrete action is taken to 
ameliorate the sense of injustice and unfairness that has grown out of 
Chile’s extraordinarily unequal society.  
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5.2 Reform of the Binomial Electoral System 
The discussion here, and a great deal of academic work, has shown that 
the binomial system both helped the transition succeed, but also helped 
cement the post-transitional model of politics. Demands for electoral 
reform often overlook the reality that the binomial system served as a 
double-edged sword by forcing political accommodation, at the same 
time as pushing negotiations into the hands of elites, with minimal citi-
zen input. In essence, it reinforced and maintained the informal institu-
tions analyzed in this article. Thus, two primary and interrelated variables 
were at the heart of the maintenance of informal institutions: the bino-
mial electoral system and the post-authoritarian structure of party com-
petition. Under the binomial system, for multiple parties to compete and 
to win, pre-electoral alliances had to be formed. These pre-electoral alli-
ances made single party non-coalition presidential candidates impossible. 
From a policy perspective, this dynamic necessitated and forced consen-
sus building and negotiated policy outcomes. Practically no policy pro-
gress could be made without complex power sharing arrangements at the 
elite, cabinet, and electoral levels, which could only be negotiated by 
powerful party actors (Siavelis 2009).  
Thus, because this article has argued that informal institutions are 
both at the heart of what made the Chilean transition a success, but also 
a driver of dissatisfaction with politics as usual, a transformation of the 
binomial system will likely lead to a transformation of the informal insti-
tutions outlined here, because the incentive structure driving politics will 
be fundamentally different. President Bachelet was successful in navi-
gating the passage of a reform to the binomial system, which will be 
replaced for the 2017 elections with a moderate proportional representa-
tion system. The new electoral formula relies on current districting, but 
reduces the number of districts to 28 by merging existing ones. Each 
district will elect between three and eight members for a total of 155, 
increasing the number of total deputies from 120 under the binomial 
system. For the Senate, each of Chile’s 15 regions forms a Senatorial 
constituency that elects between two and five senators depending on 
population. Candidates will run on open party lists and winners will con-
tinue to be determined using the D’Hondt counting method. The new 
law also provides a gender quota for the first time in Chilean history. 
Neither gender is allowed to constitute more than 60 percent of the 
candidates on a list. 
The Chilean binomial electoral system needed to be reformed. It 
was among the most visible institutional legacies of the Pinochet dicta-
torship and one of the most egregious examples of electoral engineering 
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among third-wave democracies.11 As this article has stressed, the lack of 
confidence in political institutions and political parties that characterize 
the Chilean citizenry today can in part be traced to the binomial system, 
as it distorted representation, put power of candidate selection complete-
ly in the hands of elites, and made it virtually impossible to remove in-
cumbents. While it helped spawn the informal institutions that were 
successful for the restoration of democracy, it also exacted a high cost on 
accountability, representation, and legitimacy.  
The potential impact of the reform is uncertain. The increase in dis-
trict magnitude has injected a high level of uncertainty for parties and 
voters (Cox 1997). The incentives for coalition formation and mainte-
nance outlined throughout this article will be much weaker, or may even 
disappear. This provides the potential for more fluid forms of coalition 
formation (with the possibilities of the re-emergence of the three-bloc 
pattern of center, left, and right politics that characterized Chile for so 
long (Gil 1966; Valenzuela 1978)), and potentially a less elitist form of 
policy making. Now coalition building can take place after elections 
instead of before them because parties can present their own independ-
ent lists and still win seats, given that the threshold for victory will be 
much lower. What is certain is that the Chilean partisan landscape is 
likely to experience a period of significant uncertainty and change until a 
new dynamic of party competition emerges.  
6 Conclusions: Institutional Reform as an 
Antidote to Challenges of Representation  
As has been repeatedly stressed throughout this article, democracy is 
multidimensional, involving tradeoffs between its various elements. At 
its core, democracy should be representative with the policy preferences 
of elected officials reflecting those of the electorate. While there are 
debates on the optimal form of representation, there is reason to believe 
that a model of “mandate representation” (with congruence between the 
policy preferences of the population and politicians) is more likely to 
facilitate the positive functioning of democracy (Kitschelt 1999). How-
ever, democracy also entails accountability. Voters must be provided 
opportunities via elections to award or punish (that is, re-elect or re-
move) elected officials based on the quality and nature of the representa-
                                                 
11  For a debate on the intentions of the designers of the system and its practical 
outcomes with respect to benefiting the right, see Zucco (2007) and Polga-
Hecimovich and Siavelis (2015). 
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tion provided. In short, “Governments are ‘accountable’ if citizens can 
discern representative from unrepresentative governments and can sanc-
tion them appropriately, retaining in office those incumbents who per-
form well and ousting from office those who do not” (Manin, Prze-
worski, and Stokes 1999: 10). Finally, democracy entails governability or 
the “ability of governments to make policy decisively” (Coppedge 2001: 
8), which is “mostly a top-down phenomenon” that entails “governing 
effectively” (Mainwaring and Scully 2010: 2). Governability provides 
stability and assurance that the rules of the game are known. Finally, 
democracy needs legitimacy, with the citizenry seeing democratic out-
comes and institutions as the accepted arbiters of conflict. In essence, 
legitimacy grows from the successful functioning of the other dimen-
sions of democracy.  
The relationship between dimensions of democracy is complex. 
Leaders regularly opt to privilege one dimension of democracy over 
another given their view of the optimal form of democracy. For exam-
ple, it is well known that single-member districts limit representation, but 
that limitation is often perceived as a price to pay for enhanced stability. 
Nonetheless, while this might be the perception, there is also something 
of a false dilemma in these tradeoffs. To use the same example, the limi-
tation on representation caused by single-member district systems may 
actually create instability because they exclude important political actors 
from representation.  
Therefore, although it is not a simple or zero-sum game, what is 
clear is that political leaders regularly opt for one dimension of democra-
cy knowing that there is a potential cost in terms of other dimensions. 
The most important imperative facing Chilean elites at the outset of the 
transition was of course governability, because their political futures and 
the future of democracy depended on it. They faced a series of difficult 
to navigate institutions that militated against cooperation and successful-
ly crafted informal institutions to maintain governability and stability. 
However, these informal institutions became part of a wider formula that 
constituted an ideology of stability that limited other dimensions of de-
mocracy, as well as the audacity of reforms (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 
2014). At its core, the argument of this article is that in terms of institu-
tions (both formal and informal), Chilean political leaders have consist-
ently opted for stability and governability with a high cost in terms of 
representation, accountability, and ultimately legitimacy. This is perhaps 
the best way to characterize the challenges to representation facing Chile 
today: a crisis of legitimacy of the institutions of the dictatorship and the 
political model of the transition.  
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How likely is it that institutional reform can respond to the chal-
lenges of representation set out here? The answer is uncertain and raises 
three additional questions: (1) Is this the optimal time for reform? (2) 
What are the possible unintended consequences of reform? (3) Is it too 
late for reform?  
In terms of timing, Morgan has argued quite straightforwardly that 
“crisis conditions and institutional reforms do not mix” because they 
challenge “linkage maintenance by requiring the parties to adapt to new 
institutions at the same time that they” face “other stresses from eco-
nomic crisis and social change” (Morgan 2011). This argument makes 
intuitive sense, but raises several other questions regarding Morgan’s 
theoretical approach and its application to Chile. How far along in its 
crisis is Chile? At what point should institutional reform attempts be 
abandoned? Is such a decision likely to be made with some degree of 
agency and a realization of its potential effects? If institutional reform 
efforts are out, what are the changes that can confront crisis that is fun-
damentally based in institutions? Surely the status quo cannot. In this 
sense, if Chile has not entered the period of terminal crisis, perhaps insti-
tutional reform can make a difference. 
In terms of the unintended consequences of reform, we know that 
reform measures do not always unfold in the ways intended and often 
reflect the short-term political interests of politicians. For example, 
Chile’s ill-conceived reform to shorten its presidential term to four years 
(without the possibility of immediate reelection), as of 2006, has created 
a short shadow of reform possibilities for presidents and the immediate 
initiation of the next presidential campaign the minute a president is 
sworn in. This was clearly not a good formula for setting up an incentive 
structure for the support of presidents. The Reforma Procesal Penal, which 
empowered district attorneys to investigate corruption, blew the lid off 
the campaign finance system, but has also had the unintended conse-
quence of creating uncertainty and threats to governability. Similarly, 
debates on the process of electoral reform, and the ultimate reform were, 
both in form and content, often related more to the interests of sitting 
deputies and senators than to the enhancement of democracy. Constitu-
tional reform could also fall victim to these dynamics.  
The bigger question, however, is whether it is too late for institu-
tional reform to be the antidote to what ails Chile. In terms of the bino-
mial system reform, although the reform is welcome, it has come too late 
and in the wrong form. Had it come earlier when Chile’s parties enjoyed 
high levels of citizen approval and deep connections to the populace, the 
type of moderate proportional representation (PR) adopted may have 
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functioned better, with more engaged voters and more responsive par-
ties. It is certainly possible that the genie is already out of the bottle and 
simple electoral reform alone will be insufficient to reestablish citizen 
support for political parties. In addition, because the new PR system 
employs open lists, it will likely cultivate personalist politics when Chile 
really needs better institutionalized parties. Earlier adoption and better 
design would have been optimal for Chile’s sorely needed electoral re-
form. In the end, ironically, even the strongest proponents of electoral 
reform may realize it matters less than they suspected.  
On the positive side of the ledger, campaign finance reform that es-
tablishes greater transparency and bans corporate donations can help 
recover some citizen confidence in parties. In addition, public opinion 
survey data consistently shows that Chileans have much greater confi-
dence in local institutions like the mayor and municipality compared with 
national political institutions. The new law that establishes the direct 
election of regional intendants is a positive first step in the reconnection 
of citizens with sub-national institutions, providing the possibility of 
rebuilding confidence in institutions and parties from the bottom up. 
This possibility echoes another argument made by Hagopian (1998), who 
noted the potentially positive effect that decentralization has on en-
hanced representation. In terms of deeper constitutional reform, it may 
also be too late. Without deeper changes to the socioeconomic system, it 
is doubtful whether a simple change in the constitution will solve chal-
lenges to representation in Chile and satisfy deeper demands for reform. 
However, constitutional reform remains a necessary, though perhaps not 
sufficient, prescription to change Chile. Constitutions are frameworks 
within which policy change is made. They set the framework for balanc-
ing the various dimensions of democracy outlined here, but also what is 
in the realm of the possible and who has a voice in policymaking. In this 
sense, in order to transform the sources of Chile’s representational chal-
lenges on a deeper level, constitutional change is a necessary first step. 
Chile’s formal and informal institutional structure in large part created 
the challenges to representation it faces today. While institutional chang-
es alone will not be enough to reset the balance of Chilean democracy, 
without institutional reform it is doubtful that it can be reset at all. 
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¿Crisis de Representación en Chile? La conexión institucional 
Resumen: Este artículo analiza los desafíos a la representación democrá-
tica en Chile contemporáneo, con un enfoque institucional. Sostengo que 
el modelo político post-autoritario estaba profundamente restringido y 
limitado por las instituciones y prácticas heredadas por las autoridades 
democráticas y reforzadas por el modelo de la política transicional y su 
serie de instituciones informales, que primero facilitó, pero luego obsta-
culizó el desempeño democrático. Si bien esto no necesariamente señali-
za una crisis amenazadora del régimen, hay retos profundos a la repre-
sentación y el deseo de un modelo político diferente que tenga una capa-
cidad mayor de resolver conflictos y satisfacer las demandas ciudadanas. 
Postulo que, hasta ahora, las instituciones formales e informales de Chile 
han privilegiado la estabilidad sobre la representación, la rendición de 
cuentas y la legitimidad. En consecuencia, corresponde a los movimien-
tos sociales fijar la agenda de cambio encaminada a abordar los proble-
mas más profundos de desigualdad política y social en Chile. Sostengo 
que las reformas institucionales son un antídoto necesario, pero insufi-
ciente, para los desafíos actuales de la representación.12 
Palabras claves: Chile, representación democrática, democratización, 
instituciones informales 
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